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Abstract 
Within the National Security domain there is a convergence of security responsibility across the national security 
agencies, law enforcement and private security sectors. The sensitivity of this environment requires individuals 
operating in the domain to be honest, trustworthy and loyal. Personnel vetting is a formal process used to determine an 
individual’s suitability for access to this domain. Notwithstanding this process, significant breaches of trust, security, 
and corruption still occur. 
 
In psychology, resilience is a well researched phenomenon that is considered a multidimensional construct where 
individual attributes, family aspects and social environment interact in aiding individuals to deal with vulnerability. 
There are many understandings and definitions of resilience based on theorists’ different perspectives; however, most 
agree that resilience is represented by a minimum of two aspects. The first is adversity and second, how the individual 
deals with adversity that demonstrates situational adaptation in a positive manner. 
 
The study is a work in progress and proposes the use of a recently developed Lifespan Resilience Scale. This scale will 
use resilience markers as an aid to National Security by providing vetting agencies with an additional tool for proactive 
intervention. The Lifespan Resilience Scale is currently undergoing reliability and validity testing within a student 
population. Once validated within this population, the scale will be adjusted and tested within the vetting environment 
using cross validated cohorts and expert opinion. Such a tool will assist National Security through better personnel risk 
management. 
 
Keywords 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Resilience is referred to extensively in many elements of the National Security, critical infrastructure, and corporate 
security environment discourse. The Australian Government’s National Security Science and Innovation Strategy 
document states the need to build a more prepared and resilient society (2009, p. 61) and one approach to developing 
and supporting a National Security system is through Personnel Security (PERSEC) with the clearance of personnel. 
Security vetting is a core function of PERSEC, with the primary purpose of ensuring that only trustworthy personnel 
have access to classified or sensitive information. However, with the current National Security convergence, greater 
numbers of personnel now require access to the National Security environment. During the period January 2005 through 
to November 2007 10,255 Top Secret clearances alone were granted (Australian National Assessment Organisation, 
2008), increasing the load on both state and federal vetting resources. 
 
Whilst cases of espionage remain relatively rare, the risk posed to National Security by insiders with access to highly 
classified information remains extreme. For example, in the USA between 1947 to 2007 there has been approximately 
170 publicly acknowledged cases of espionage (Herbig, 2008). Within Australia in the last 15 years there have been the 
Wispeleare and LaPas cases, resulting in the Blick Inquiry of 2000 that recommended psychometric assessment as part 
of the positive vetting process (IGIS, 2008). The positive vetting process is an intrusive and comprehensive process 
used for those individuals requiring access of the highest security classification. In addition to initial vetting, personnel 
with Top Secret Positive Vetting are subject to continuous review, assigned case managers and expected to keep their 
case managers advised of life changes that may influence their personal vulnerability. The introduction of demonstrated 
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resilience indicators may assist case managers to make better informed analysis of potential risk posed by personnel at 
times of change in circumstances or crisis. 
 
Resilience, in the field of psychology, is a well researched phenomenon with an extensive literature and considered a 
multidimensional construct, where individual attributes, family aspects and social environment play a role in aiding the 
individual to deal with some form of adversity or vulnerability. Resilience is represented by a minimum of two aspects; 
first that there is adversity and second, that resilience is demonstrated by the individual in dealing with the adversity in a 
way that demonstrates competence or adaptation to the environment or situation in a positive manner (Luthar, Cicchetti, 
& Becker, 2000; Masten, 2001; Schilling, 2008). 
 
Study Objectives 
 
Resilience is an undefined term when considered within the context of security. Nevertheless, resilience is a term that is 
used extensively in many Australian Government documents (Attorney-General's Department, 2009; Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2009) in relation to National Security strategy, direction and policy. For example, the 
National Security Resilience Policy Division (NSRPD) provides policy advice on emergency management, protective 
security, identity security, e-security and critical infrastructure protection. Therefore, the proposed study merges the two 
distinct disciplines of Psychology and Security Science to aid the National Security domain. 
 
Psychometric testing has been a part of the Top Secret Positive Vetting process for the past ten-years; however, the 
value of psychometric testing as a predictor may be somewhat limited. Inappropriate action was more likely to be 
influenced by the environment, life stressors and disciplinary non-compliance (Booth-Kewley, Larson, Alderton, 
Farmer, & Highfill-McRoy, 2009; O'Connor-Boes, Chandler, & Timm, 1997), which is consistent with Herbig ’s 
emerging evidence to suggest that significant life events are triggers for espionage (2008). 
 
The study is a work in progress; nevertheless, it puts forward a proposition that the Lifespan Resilience Scale can be 
developed to provide a suitable tool to aid National Security agencies to better manage, apply and maintain security 
clearances. The objectives of this study were to consider the suitability of the Lifespan Resilience Scale within the 
National Security personnel vetting domain and put forward a methodology to test and measure the efficacy of such an 
aid. 
 
NATIONAL SECURITY VETTING 
 
Personnel Security (PERSEC) is a process of ensuring that the individual is not a security risk and is developed in 
conjunction with an overall security policy and framework. Vetting is the most common form of PERSEC and is based 
on the evaluation of an individual’s character, attributes, background and actions (Attorney-General's Department, 
2010a; Defence Vetting Report, 2007). Depending on the level of access to be granted, an individual will be assigned a 
level of aftercare and subjected to periodic security reviews. Periodic review and the process of aftercare is recognition 
that individual circumstances change over time and with that, the individuals’ risk profile. 
 
The security vetting process 
 
The vetting process has two primary aims, to validate a person's identity and ensure their integrity. People have been 
known to present themselves as someone other than themselves, identities are stolen and people may have multiple 
identities for different aspects of their lives (Thomson, 2007). Integrity ensures the honesty of the person and 
determines their security vulnerabilities including police checks, referee checks and in some cases a security assessment 
interview. The interview, which requires specialised skills, seeks to confirm the suitability of the person for a security 
clearance by determining whether they have “skeletons in their past”. 
 
There are five levels of security clearance, namely restricted, confidential, secret, top secret (negative vetting), and top 
secret (positive vetting) (Defence Vetting Report, 2007). Positive vetting involves an “intensive enquiry into the 
subject’s life until suitability for clearance has been established beyond reasonable doubt” (Attorney-General's 
Department, 2010b, p. 29). It is an intrusive process for individuals requiring access to information of the highest 
security classification i.e., Top Secret. Negative vetting is less intrusive and only aims to identify the individual’s 
background and lifestyle. 
 
Vetting and suitability indicators 
 
As outlined in the Protective Security Manual (Attorney-General's Department, 2010b), the evaluation of suitability for 
clearance is based on suitability indicators. These are maturity, responsibility, tolerance, honesty and loyalty. Maturity 
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is evaluated by analysing a person’s capacity for honest self-appraisal, personal life choices, hobbies, capacity to cope 
with stress, and the use of drugs and alcohol. Responsibility is evaluated by examining a person’s history of financial 
responsibility and general personal history, such as information regarding work, educational background and security 
records. In addition, active involvement in community or charity organisations can indicate both maturity and 
responsibility. Tolerance is evaluated by examining a person’s appreciation of a ‘broader perspective’, for example an 
ability to accept other people’s life choices or to respect of other cultures. Honesty is evaluated by examining whether a 
person has a history of unlawful behaviour. Finally, loyalty is evaluated by examining a person’s commitment to the 
democratic process with their primary loyalty to Australia (Attorney-General's Department, 2010b). 
 
Current Protective Security Policy 
 
Recent Australian Government revisions to National Security have resulted in the Protective Security Policy 
Framework, which defines how the government intends to protect its people, information and assets with engagement 
with the Australian people. The Protective Security Policy Framework (Attorney-General's Department, 2010c, p. 1) is 
designed for agencies to identify their individual levels of security risk tolerance, achieve the mandatory requirements 
for protective security expected by Government and develop an appropriate security culture to meet business goals. 
A core component of the Protective Security Policy Framework is Personnel Security (PERSEC), which has mandatory 
requirements that agencies provide appropriate and approved personnel clearance. Such clearance includes Australian 
Government employees, contractors and temporary staff who require ongoing access to Australian Government 
information and resources (Attorney-General's Department, 2010c, p. 21). The Australian Government requirement is 
that agencies must have in place PERSEC aftercare arrangements. Aftercare includes the requirement for individuals 
holding security clearances to advise their relevant agency of any change in personal circumstance that may impact on 
their continuing suitability to access security classified resources (Attorney-General's Department, 2010c, p. 24). This 
prescribed requirement drives the need for vetting and clearance aftercare tools to assist in the process, which the 
study’s Lifespan Resilience Scale could provide. 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESILIENCE 
 
During the lifespan people may encounter challenging situations that place them at risk of negative psychological, 
social and physical consequences. Some people respond adversely to these challenging situations and indulge in a range 
of negative behaviours, for example, substance abuse or violence. Adversity is evaluated according to negative life 
circumstances and adaptation is defined as successful performance on age-developmental tasks (Schilling, 2008). 
There is some debate within the psychological literature regarding whether resilience is a personality trait that is stable, 
fixed and measurable (Cicchetti & Rogosch, 2007; Flores, Cicchetti, & Rogosch, 2005), whether it is a dynamic process 
that is contingent on context (Luthar, et al., 2000; Rutter, 2007), whether there is a biological component (Cicchetti & 
Rogosch, 2007; Rutter, 2007), or whether it is a multidimensional construct which also depends on ones cultural 
background (Ungar, 2004, 2005a). The Triarchic Framework of resilience (Werner & Smith, 1982) was one of the first 
frameworks to include environmental factors which suggested that protective and vulnerability processes need to be 
viewed on three levels, namely community influences, family influences and the individual. 
 
Some researchers use the terms resiliency and resilience interchangeably. However, resiliency and resilience are two 
different constructs. Resiliency relates to a personality characteristic and resilience refers to a dynamic developmental 
process (Luthar, et al., 2000). The use of these terms should be exercised with caution to avoid further confusion. For 
example, as resiliency refers to a personality trait, the term may lead to misconceptions that some people “do not have 
what it takes” (Luthar, et al., 2000, p. 546) to overcome adversity. Luther et al. (2000) indicated that there is a need for 
specificity in discussing resilient outcomes, such as educational resilience, emotional resilience and behavioural 
resilience. 
 
Risk and protective factors 
 
The level of an individual’s resilience can depend upon both internal and external resources, which may facilitate or 
inhibit positive adaptive behaviour. The resources that facilitate adaptive behaviour are generally referred to as 
protective factors; those that inhibit adaptive behaviour and risk factors. A number of protective and risk factors that 
either guard against or result in poor outcomes have been identified and unfavourable outcomes are usually defined as 
behavioural or emotional problems (Hawley & DeHaan, 1996). Protective factors can be considered ‘buffers’ between 
the ‘person’ and the ‘stressful situation’ (Hawley & DeHaan, 1996). Resilience research has demonstrated that 
individuals across all age groups have the ability to successfully negotiate challenges or adverse events despite many 
risk factors. 
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Risk factors include poverty, low socio economic status, war, violence, sexual abuse, family dislocation, exposure to 
maltreatment or violence, loss of a parent, physical injury, mental illness, race or ethnicity, minority status, parental 
mental illness, parental relationship instability and community violence (Flores, et al., 2005; Luthar, et al., 2000; 
Martinez-Torteya, Bogat, von Eye, & Levendosky, 2009; Masten, 2001; Ungar, 2007). 
 
Protective factors can be classified into three main categories: those within the individual (psychological/dispositional 
attributes); family support/cohesion (and support from friends and peers); and external support (in terms of the 
environment/community systems) (Friborg, Hjemdal, Rosenvinge, & Martinussen, 2003; Hawley & DeHaan, 1996; 
Ribbens & McCarthy, 2006; Schilling, 2008) and coping processes. Dispositional attributes or internal factors attributed 
to the person may include self-esteem, coping skills, self confidence, self-efficacy, internal locus of control, pro-social 
behaviour and empathy, optimism, positive self image, intellectual functioning, self-regulation, intrinsic motivation, and 
pleasure in mastery (Cicchetti & Rogosch, 2007; Flores, et al., 2005; Friborg, et al., 2003; Luthar, et al., 2000; Masten, 
2001). Positive emotion or self-esteem has been found to be a protective factor strongly associated with resilience and 
improved coping. 
 
In terms of the second protective factor (family support/cohesion), positive or effective parenting, parental warmth and 
support are factors which predict positive adaptation in children when faced with adverse circumstances (Martinez-
Torteya, et al., 2009). Stable positive relationships are associated with resilience (Rutter, 2007). Other care-givers and 
adults, that are not part of the immediate family, are important to the resilience of high-risk adolescents (Ungar, 2004). 
Such relationships allow the adolescent to believe in their ability to overcome adversity. Although much of this research 
has been conducted with children and adolescents, the knowledge is transferable to adult populations. The third 
protective factor is environment and community systems, which provide resources necessary for positive development 
(Ungar, 2005a, 2005b, 2007). 
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESILIENCE SCALES 
 
Scales that have been developed to measure resilience of the individual and the family do not fit with emerging ideas 
associated with resilience research. For example, existing measures do not examine the relationship between the two 
types of resilience. Nevertheless, current measures have been adapted by changing the items to measure resilience in 
adolescence (Hjemdal, Friborg, Stiles, Martinussen, & Rosenvinge, 2006) based on items developed to measure 
resilience in adults (Friborg, et al., 2003). 
 
Current resilience scales 
 
There are a large number of resilience measures, which generally assesses protective factors or resources that involve 
personal characteristics and coping styles (Connor & Davidson, 2003; B. W. Smith et al., 2008). These provide a useful 
summary of the types of resources that support positive adaptation. A range of measures have been designed to assess 
resilience in children (Prince-Embury, 2007), adolescents (Resilience Scale for Adolescents (READ) (Hjemdal, et al., 
2006); Child and Youth Resilience Measure (CYRM) (Ungar, 2008) and adults (Connor & Davidson, 2003; Friborg, et 
al., 2003; B. W. Smith, et al., 2008). In this study, the focus is on the adult measures. However, many of these current 
scales have limitations such as the unidimensional Brief Resilience Scale (BRS) (B. W. Smith, et al., 2008), are internal 
to the individual Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale (CD-RISC) (Connor & Davidson, 2003) or fails to account for the 
extended literature (Wagnild & Young, 1993). 
 
The most relevant scale to date is the Resilience Scale for Adults (RSA) (Friborg, et al., 2003) that measures protective 
resources that promote adult resilience. Five dimensions are outlined: personal competence, social competence, social 
support, family coherence, and personal structure. The RSA covers all three categories of resilience, namely 
dispositional attributes, family cohesion/warmth and external support systems. This approach corresponds well to the 
overall categorisation of resilience as a multidimensional construct characterised by personal/dispositional attributed, 
family support and external support systems (Friborg, et al., 2003; Ribbens & McCarthy, 2006; Schilling, 2008). 
 
Resilience scale for vetting 
 
Whilst these scales are useful, none have been specifically designed to meet the needs of National Security vetting and 
the role of case managers in aftercare. The researchers are currently developing a resilience measure that can be applied 
across the lifespan, from 12 years through to the elderly. It is anticipated that the development of this questionnaire will 
lead directly to a specialised measure that is useful for both initial vetting on recruitment and as an ongoing tool to 
assess a current state of resilience in personnel.  
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It is evident that resilience does not only depend on individual attributes, but also on the protective structures that 
operate around the individual, for example the family, the community and the environment. Models of resilience have 
adopted this view in terms of working with high-risk individuals. Importantly, one core principle by which resilience 
models or resilience program development operates is to enhance resilience. In order to achieve this, knowledge of 
protective factors needs to be reflected in the program development (Christiansen, Christiansen, & Howard, 1997). 
 
THE INSIDER THREAT 
 
Factors linked to insider risk may be divided under stressors (personal, situational and life events), motivators and 
personality factors. 
 
Stressors (personal, situational and life events) 
 
Shaw, Ruby and Post (1998) outlined that there are personal and situational stressors that may lead to insider risk, such 
as embarrassment of being caught, feeling betrayed or rejected, workplace conflict, illness or death, disappointments at 
work, criminal or drug activities, family issues or financial stress. Shaw and colleagues mention that these types of 
stressors “can trigger an emotional reaction leading to impaired judgement and reckless or vindictive behaviour” (E. 
Shaw, et al., 1998, p. 8), for example espionage, theft, fraud or sabotage. Likewise, Heuer (n.d.) maintains that the 
decision to betray is triggered by a life event, whether in a person’s personal or professional life that increases the stress 
beyond a person’s breaking point. Heuer suggest that less emotionally stable people may react to such satiations by 
substance abuse, suicide or harming the organisation they work for. Herbig (n.d., p. xi) adds that triggers may include 
both positive and/or negative crises, for example divorce, death, or starting a new relationship that may precede an 
individuals’ decision to commit espionage. 
 
Motivation 
 
Various authors (Gelles, n.d.; Golubev, n.d.; Herbig, 2008; E. Shaw, et al., 1998; E. D. Shaw, Fisher, & Rose, 2009) 
report that there are specific factors that can motivate a person to harm the organisation they work for. People will be 
tempted to commit a crime if they are unhappy, the crime is easy to commit, there is opportunity and the reward is 
sufficient (M. R. Smith, 1990). Motivation to commit a crime may increase if there is an intellectual challenge, to 
satisfy curiosity and to gain personal advantage, such as personal, financial, and competitive and the motivation may be 
deeper than it appears (Gelles, n.d.). Nevertheless, money is not only a motivation for what it can buy, but more for 
what it symbolises with power and success. As Herbig found, “since the 1990s, money has not been the primary 
motivator for espionage” (2008, p. xi). Individuals commit espionage to fulfil complex emotional needs (Gelles, n.d.) or 
a combination of emotional and financial needs (Heuer, n.d.). Espionage cases that appear to be financially motivated 
are actually motivated by emotional needs, as money symbolises success, power, influence, a way to happiness and self-
esteem. 
 
Personality factors 
 
Personality factors are important to consider in terms of prevention. General personality weaknesses include greed, 
impulsiveness, vindictiveness, alienation, paranoia and sensation seeking (Heuer, n.d.). In addition, spies usually suffer 
from one or more personality disorders (Gelles, n.d.) with the two most common being antisocial personality disorder 
and narcissistic personality. A person with antisocial personality disorder rejects rules, lacks feelings of guilt, is 
manipulative, is oriented toward immediate gratification and has no interest in learning from the past. They have little 
ability to form attachments or to develop a commitment to anyone or anything; therefore, their ability to develop loyalty 
is compromised. A person with narcissistic personality has unwarranted feelings of importance or self-esteem, a sense 
of entitlement, lack of empathy for others, they are over-achievers, have a high self image and a drive to be successful. 
Both personality factors have been associated with espionage (E. D. Shaw, et al., 2009). 
 
PROPOSITION TO DEFINE VETTING RESILIENCE INDICATORS 
 
The study has completed an extensive literature review, which supports the use of resilience indicators in vetting. 
Resilience would appear to be an additional tool that National Security vetting personnel could use as an aid. In 
addition, the Lifespan Resilience Scale (LRS) meets many of the current literature in resilience and in particular, with 
slight modification could meet risk and protective factors. Such a scale could be considered the Lifespan Resilience 
Scale (Vetting) (LRSV). Currently, a study is in progress to test the reliability and validity of the LRS. As this study is 
in progress, the proposition will be to test and measure the efficacy of such resilience indicators within a number of 
vetting environments. These vetting environments will include both Australian Federal and state departments that use 
Personnel Security (PERSEC) vetting in their staff selection and maintenance for National Security clearances. 
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Initially, the resilience questionnaire will be applied by experienced vetting staff within a state department against a 
sample group of employers currently undergoing either initial clearance or clearance maintenance. Cross validation with 
both cohorts and comment from expert vetting personnel will be gained to consider their views of the tool in 
application. After approximately 12-months, a follow-up of the sample clearances will be gained to assess personnel 
performance, characteristics, action and general supervisors’ comment to cross validate with the LRSV. The intent is to 
confirm that the Scale supports the identified protective factors, and demonstrates an understanding of the resilience of 
the population and functions as an indicator for aftercare intervention. 
 
LIFESPAN RESILIENCE SCALE VETTING TOOL 
 
The process of vetting, gaining and maintaining clearance is a core function in the protection of Australian National 
interests. There are many issues with current vetting for most government and non-government departments operating 
in the National Security environment. Nevertheless, it is proposed that the Lifespan Resilience Scale (Vetting) (LRSV) 
could provide an additional tool for vetting agencies. Such a tool would assist case managers in clearance aftercare and 
allow proactive intervention. In addition, there is a need to increase resilience by identifying and increasing protective 
factors, understanding the resilience of the population and using resilience as a protector. 
 
Vetting issues 
 
All Australian Government Agencies must have in place PERSEC aftercare arrangements (Attorney-General's 
Department, 2010c, p. 24). Such aftercare, in particular for top secret positive clearances, involves agency staff 
managing, monitoring and reporting any significant changes in personal and their circumstance that may impact upon 
suitability for continuing access security classified resources. Therefore, there is a prescriptive requirement to provide 
appropriate aftercare services. However, this process is resource excessive, very intrusive and prone to the complex 
nature of personality traits. Also the onus is in-part on the individual to come forward when there may be personnel 
changes, life triggers, etc. 
 
Resilience as a vetting tool 
 
The Lifespan Resilience Scale for Vetting (LRSV) would not replace psychometric testing, background checking or 
other vetting tools, rather it is an additional aid to the vetting sector. Nevertheless, there has been some concern over the 
efficacy of psychometric testing as a predicator towards future action. As O’Connor-Boes and Chandler stated, 
“predictive scales did very poorly during .. cross-validation” (1997, p. iii). Therefore, the LRSV should provide an aid 
to case managers within the context of understanding how individuals’ may respond to or cope with particular changes 
or triggers in their life or environment. 
 
There is some evidence which suggests that whilst in the past indicators of vulnerability such as illicit drug use, 
alcoholism and gambling are proving less relevant and trending downwards as causal factors in the current 
environment; however, there appears to be an increasing trend in significant life events triggering espionage. In 
addition, violators that had committed a breach of trust tended to have indicators that they were more maladjusted and 
irresponsible or were more immature (O'Connor-Boes, et al., 1997, p. iv). Notwithstanding these factors, for the very 
small percentage of offenders who commit espionage after events such as divorce or workplace demotion there are 
thousands more who encounter these same events or may be considered to be immature by work colleagues, but they do 
not commit an act of  espionage (Herbig, 2008). 
 
Individuals will fall within the spectrum of the Lifespan Resilience Scale for Vettimng, as a population within a bell 
curve. If it can be ascertained that individuals at x resilience are more likely to respond in a particular way for life 
events, then case managers will be in a better position to monitor and determine thresholds at which active management 
intervention might be required. Such a tool could prevent espionage occurring. Moreover, it may be that through 
determining resilience levels of individuals that the real risk of vulnerable behaviours may be measured, allowing for 
better management of individuals who abuse alcohol, drugs and the like. Aftercare then becomes tailored to the 
individual and adaptive to the circumstance. Furthermore it may be possible that by determining an individual is an x 
measure of resilience, a range of protective or coping measures may be introduced as a proactive and educative 
component of the aftercare process.  Moreover this is in keeping with government policy that in all cases vetting 
decisions be based on an assessment of the individual as a whole person (Attorney-General's Department, 2010c, p. 23). 
 
Vetting intervention 
 
Once a person breaches agency policy, they may feel incapable of reporting such a breach. Such stressors may lead a 
person to feel that they may lose their job, be rejected or criticised (E. Shaw, et al., 1998). On the other hand, a person 
Proceedings of the 3rd Australian Security and Intelligence Conference 
 
41 | P a g e  
 
may feel resilient enough to self manage the situation. In practice, it would not be uncommon for someone to be 
suspected of breaching trust to be reassigned to a non-trusted workplace or be stood down with or without pay. 
Research has suggested that one of the best predictors of violation has not been the pre-employment process, rather 
post-hired misconduct (O'Connor-Boes, et al., 1997, p. v). 
 
This study suggests that such self management is a greater concern, as many past breaches of National Security has 
been by persons who are embedded within an agency and at a senior level. As Herbig indicates “there has been a 
‘graying’ of the American spy in the recent past” (2008, p. vii). Therefore, those that feel more in control and have 
greater authority within their organisation may have a higher measure of resilience. Such a high measure of resilience 
may require greater aftercare, perhaps greater than those with low resilience, as this cohort may let the situation become 
dire until they are incapable of reporting their breaches. Intervention that acts as external support in providing the 
protective factor is important (Ungar, 2005a, 2005b). The clearance aftercare process could be equated to the protective 
factor, raising the efficacy of the clearance function in PERSEC. 
 
Resilience as a protector 
 
Resilience may be used as a protective factor in developing a catalogue of life events and risk weighting in relation to 
resilience profiles. Such understanding may resolve some vetting issues, be used as an additional aid for initial vetting 
and clearance aftercare, and lead to improved vetting in the National Security domain. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
National Security has to continue to improve the ability to detect the insider threat. A primary tool is Personnel Security 
(PERSEC) and the use of vetting, where identity, integrity and character are assessed. The level of clearance depends on 
the persons’ access to the security environment or information. The process of vetting and the maintenance of clearance 
with aftercare is resource extensive, intrusive and it has not always been successful. Nevertheless, such requirements are 
mandated by the Australian Government for all departments that have exposure to the National Security environment. 
The nature of what motivates an individual to commit an act of espionage continues to change and there are many 
difficulties in dealing with the intelligent human insider threat. 
 
From a psychological perspective, there are a number of factors that buffer people from stressors, such as risk or 
vulnerability, their ability to have some protective support and the person themselves. Resilience considers how a 
person may respond to such negative life situations or an adverse change in their environment, for example a marriage 
breakup, death or other trigger event. Within the context of the study, resilience is considered the potential to exhibit 
resourcefulness by using available internal and external resources in response to different contextual and developmental 
challenges. 
 
This article presents a work in progress study that suggests an extension to the recently developed Lifespan Resilience 
Scale (LRS), with the LRS Vetting (LSRV) tool. The LRS is currently being validated, from which changes will be 
made to direct the scale into both state and national security vetting agencies. Cohorts will be tested and cross validated, 
and expert opinion gained. The LRSV could be an aid to National Security, by providing government and non-
government departments operating in the National Security environment with an additional tool. Such a tool would 
assist case managers in clearance aftercare and allow proactive intervention. In addition, there is a need to develop 
resilience in individuals by working on such protective factors, understanding the resilience of the population and using 
resilience as a protector. 
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